Wednesday, March 1, 2017

A.C. No. 932 IN RE: SANTIAGO 70 PHIL 66

IN RE: ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO
A.C. No. 932
June 21, 1940

FACTS: Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for 9 years, sought the legal advice of the respondent for a possible second marriage.

They prepared the document. Baniquit then asked, "Would there be no trouble?" The respondent points to his diploma and said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid."

Hence, he contracted a second marriage.

Respondent realized that he had made a mistake for the timeline of the separation of husband and wife, and for that reason, he immediately sent for the contracting parties to sign the deed of cancellation of the document.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be suspended.

RULING: Yes. The advice of the respondent and the document prepared by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. It constitutes malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.


In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the complainant legal advice.

Tuesday, February 28, 2017

AC. No. 1261 TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID

TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID
A.C. No. 1261
December 29, 1983

FACTS: Tan Tek Beng and Atty. Timoteo David entered an agreement. Where in the agreement lawyer David did not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.

However, mutual accusations of doublecross ended such.

Hence, Tan Tek Beng denounced David to the President Assistant, Office of the Civil Relation and to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said agreement is tantamount to malpractice.

RULING: The Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers”

The practice of law is a profession and not a business.

A lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others.

The Court censures David for entering such void and unethical agreement and discountenances his conduct, not because of the complaints, but because David should have known better.

Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.

A.C. No. 5365 OBLES v. DECIEMBRE 457 SCRA 341

OBLES v. DECIEMBRE
A.C. No. 5365
April 27, 2005

FACTS: On July 1, 1999, Lourdes Obles renewed her loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10 000, through respondent, Atty. Victor Deciembre.

As security for the loan, she issued five PNB blank checks to Deciembre.

Two months after, Lourdes paid P14 874.37 for the loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests. Notwithstanding, Deciembre filled up four blank checks for P50 000 each.

He then filed a criminal suit against the spouses for Estafa and violation of BP 22. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Deciembre violated provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING: Deciembre, by not returning the blank checks to the spouses committed abominable Dishonesty by Abusing the Confidence invested by the spouses to him as their high regard for lawyers.

By filling the same and filing criminal suits against them deprived Franklin of his constitutional right to liberty for three months. These results to Deciembre being guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Professional Misconduct amounting to Moral Depravity.

Possessing good moral character must least have common honesty for lawyers must be ministers of Truth.

The Court finds the suspension of two years to be too mild. Deceit and Misrepresentation is reprehensible.

Hence, Deciembre is guilty of Gross Misconduct and Violation of Rules 1.03 and 7.03 of the CPR and is indefinitely suspended.

Wednesday, February 22, 2017

G.R. No. 189028 ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 701 SCRA 269

ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 189028
July 16, 2013
701 SCRA 269

FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.

They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.

Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.

Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation of the right to equal protection

RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.

Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.

In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.


G.R. No. 198554 GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2012) 677 SCRA 750

GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554
July 30, 2012
677 SCRA 750

FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.

Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and (2) Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution

RULING: (1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”

(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.


It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.

G.R. No. 179267 GARCIA v. DRILON 699 SCRA 352

GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

G.R. No. 124354 RAMOS (1999) v. CA 321 SCRA 584

RAMOS v. CA
G.R. No. 124354
December 29, 1999
321 SCRA 584

FACTS: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was experiencing occasional pains allegedly caused by stones in her gall bladder. She was told to undergo an operation and after some tests and exams, she was indicated fit for surgery.

Dr. Orlino Hozaka, defendant, decided that Erlinda should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation. Rogelio, husband of Erlinda, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist.

Around 7:30 AM of June 17, 1985, Herminda (sister-in-law of Erlinda) accompanied Erlinda to the operating room and saw Dr. Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer anesthesia. Dr. Hosaka only arrived around 12:15 PM, three hours late. Nonetheless, the operation continued and Herminda then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient and heard her saying “and hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok”. Thereafter, bluish discoloration of the nailbeds appeared on the patient. Hence, Dr. Hosaka issued an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. The patient was placed in a trendelenburg position for decrease of blood supply in her brain. At 3:00 PM, the patient was taken to the ICU.

Four months after, the patient was released from the hospital. However, the patient has been in a comatose condition.

Hence, the petition filed a civil case for damages against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.

Petitioners contended that the faulty management of her airway casused the lack of oxygen in the patient’s brain. On the respondent’s part, they contended that the brain damage was Erlinda's allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.

ISSUES: (1) Will the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply in this case? and (2) Did the negligence of the respondents cause the unfortunate comatose condition of petitioner Erlinda Ramos?

RULING: (1) Yes. The Court finds the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care.

In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.

Erlinda submitted herself soundly and fit for surgery. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation.

Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur.

(2a) With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, the court find her negligent during the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient which she admitted.

During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place.

Even granting that the tube was successfully inserted during the second attempt, it was obviously too late.

An experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-operative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going around the short neck and protruding teeth.

Hence, she was negligent.

(2b) For Dr. Orlino Hosaka, as the head of the surgical team and as the so-called captain of the ship, it is the surgeons responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner

Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the captain of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape the court that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's operation, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient.

Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlindas condition.

(2c) As for the hospital (employer) itself, the Court ruled that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.

In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180.

Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlindas condition.