GARCIA v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554
G.R. No. 198554
July 30, 2012
677 SCRA 750
FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was
charged with and convicted of violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War
(Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to
disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net
worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA
6713.
Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by
the OP directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been
fully served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the
RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a
preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined
at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to
the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP)
Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP
confirmed the sentence of the court martial against him, Garcia was arrested
and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum security
compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29
of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct
from ordinary courts.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: (1)
Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and (2)
Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War
is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution
RULING: (1) The
Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) (Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of
imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was under preventive
confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the
President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.
The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court
within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal court.” As such,
certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the
Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary.
“[A]bsent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the
implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied.
In fact, the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his
sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”
(2) The Court further held that the application of Article
29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.
It, however, does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires
is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE:
ReplyDeleteThe application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with
the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state' s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state' s duly constituted authorities.In other words, the concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature under military
courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
It must be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are
penal in nature.
Thanks, Khennete for the recommendation. I will try to revise this as soon as possible.
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