G.R. No. 189028 ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 701 SCRA 269

ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 189028

July 16, 2013

701 SCRA 269

FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.

They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.

Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.

Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation of the right to equal protection

RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.

Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.

In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.

G.R. No. 198554 GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2012) 677 SCRA 750

GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554

July 30, 2012

677 SCRA 750

FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.

Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and (2) Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution

RULING: (1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”

(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.

G.R. No. 179267 GARCIA v. DRILON 699 SCRA 352

GARCIA v. DRILON

G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013

699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

G.R. No. 128845 INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING 333 SCRA 13

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING

333 SCRA 13

G.R. No. 128845

June 1, 2000

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and  a salary rate 25% more than local hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. 

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity.

RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.