INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK v. GEUCO
G.R. No. 141968
February 12, 2001
351 SCRA 516
FACTS: The respondent Gueco
Spouses obtained a loan from petitioner (now UnionBank) to purchase a car.
Hence, the Spouses executed promissory notes which were payable in monthly
installments and chattel mortgage over the car to serve as security for the
notes.
The
Spouses defaulted in payment. The Bank, therefore, filed a civil action for "Sum
of Money with Prayer for a Writ of Replevin" before the MTC. The car was
detained inside the Bank’s compound.
Dr.
Gueco delivered a manager's check in amount of P150,000.00 but the car was not
released because of his refusal to sign the Joint Motion to Dismiss for they
had not yet filed their Answer. The Bank insisted that the joint motion to
dismiss is standard operating procedure in their bank to effect a compromise
and to preclude future filing of claims, counterclaims or suits for damages.
After
several demand letters and meetings with bank representatives, the spouses
initiated a civil action for damages. The RTC held that there was a meeting of
the minds between the parties as to the reduction of the amount of indebtedness
and the release of the car but said agreement did not include the signing of
the joint motion to dismiss as a condition sine qua non for the effectivity of
the compromise.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there was an agreement with respect to the
execution of the joint motion to dismiss as a condition for the compromise
agreement; and (2) Whether or not the spouses are entitled for damages arising
from fraud.
RULING: (1) No. Being an
affirmative allegation, petitioner has the burden of evidence to prove his
claim that the oral compromise entered into by the parties included the
stipulation that the parties would jointly file a motion to dismiss. This
petitioner failed to do. Notably, even the Metropolitan Trial Court, while
ruling in favor of the petitioner and thereby dismissing the complaint, did not
make a factual finding that the compromise agreement included the condition of
the signing of a joint motion to dismiss.
(2)
No. The Court failed to see how the act of the petitioner bank in requiring the
respondent to sign the joint motion to dismiss could constitute as fraud.
Fraud
has been defined as the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice. Petitioner
may have been remiss in informing Dr. Gueco that the signing of a joint motion
to dismiss is a standard operating procedure of petitioner bank. However, this
cannot in any way have prejudiced Dr. Gueco.
The
whole point of the parties entering into the compromise agreement was in order
that Dr. Gueco would pay his outstanding account and in return petitioner would
return the car and drop the case for money and replevin before the Metropolitan
Trial Court. The joint motion to dismiss was but a natural consequence of the
compromise agreement and simply stated that Dr. Gueco had fully settled his
obligation, hence, the dismissal of the case.
Hence,
petitioner's act of requiring Dr. Gueco to sign the joint motion to dismiss cannot
be said to be a deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner to renege on the
compromise agreement of the parties.
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