Tuesday, February 28, 2017

AC. No. 1261 TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID

TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID
A.C. No. 1261
December 29, 1983

FACTS: Tan Tek Beng and Atty. Timoteo David entered an agreement. Where in the agreement lawyer David did not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.

However, mutual accusations of doublecross ended such.

Hence, Tan Tek Beng denounced David to the President Assistant, Office of the Civil Relation and to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said agreement is tantamount to malpractice.

RULING: The Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers”

The practice of law is a profession and not a business.

A lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others.

The Court censures David for entering such void and unethical agreement and discountenances his conduct, not because of the complaints, but because David should have known better.

Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.

A.C. No. 5365 OBLES v. DECIEMBRE 457 SCRA 341

OBLES v. DECIEMBRE
A.C. No. 5365
April 27, 2005

FACTS: On July 1, 1999, Lourdes Obles renewed her loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10 000, through respondent, Atty. Victor Deciembre.

As security for the loan, she issued five PNB blank checks to Deciembre.

Two months after, Lourdes paid P14 874.37 for the loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests. Notwithstanding, Deciembre filled up four blank checks for P50 000 each.

He then filed a criminal suit against the spouses for Estafa and violation of BP 22. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Deciembre violated provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING: Deciembre, by not returning the blank checks to the spouses committed abominable Dishonesty by Abusing the Confidence invested by the spouses to him as their high regard for lawyers.

By filling the same and filing criminal suits against them deprived Franklin of his constitutional right to liberty for three months. These results to Deciembre being guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Professional Misconduct amounting to Moral Depravity.

Possessing good moral character must least have common honesty for lawyers must be ministers of Truth.

The Court finds the suspension of two years to be too mild. Deceit and Misrepresentation is reprehensible.

Hence, Deciembre is guilty of Gross Misconduct and Violation of Rules 1.03 and 7.03 of the CPR and is indefinitely suspended.

Wednesday, February 22, 2017

G.R. No. 189028 ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 701 SCRA 269

ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 189028
July 16, 2013
701 SCRA 269

FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.

They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.

Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.

Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation of the right to equal protection

RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.

Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.

In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.


G.R. No. 198554 GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2012) 677 SCRA 750

GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554
July 30, 2012
677 SCRA 750

FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.

Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and (2) Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution

RULING: (1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”

(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.


It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.

G.R. No. 179267 GARCIA v. DRILON 699 SCRA 352

GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

G.R. No. 124354 RAMOS (1999) v. CA 321 SCRA 584

RAMOS v. CA
G.R. No. 124354
December 29, 1999
321 SCRA 584

FACTS: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was experiencing occasional pains allegedly caused by stones in her gall bladder. She was told to undergo an operation and after some tests and exams, she was indicated fit for surgery.

Dr. Orlino Hozaka, defendant, decided that Erlinda should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation. Rogelio, husband of Erlinda, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist.

Around 7:30 AM of June 17, 1985, Herminda (sister-in-law of Erlinda) accompanied Erlinda to the operating room and saw Dr. Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer anesthesia. Dr. Hosaka only arrived around 12:15 PM, three hours late. Nonetheless, the operation continued and Herminda then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient and heard her saying “and hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok”. Thereafter, bluish discoloration of the nailbeds appeared on the patient. Hence, Dr. Hosaka issued an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. The patient was placed in a trendelenburg position for decrease of blood supply in her brain. At 3:00 PM, the patient was taken to the ICU.

Four months after, the patient was released from the hospital. However, the patient has been in a comatose condition.

Hence, the petition filed a civil case for damages against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.

Petitioners contended that the faulty management of her airway casused the lack of oxygen in the patient’s brain. On the respondent’s part, they contended that the brain damage was Erlinda's allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.

ISSUES: (1) Will the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply in this case? and (2) Did the negligence of the respondents cause the unfortunate comatose condition of petitioner Erlinda Ramos?

RULING: (1) Yes. The Court finds the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care.

In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.

Erlinda submitted herself soundly and fit for surgery. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation.

Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur.

(2a) With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, the court find her negligent during the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient which she admitted.

During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place.

Even granting that the tube was successfully inserted during the second attempt, it was obviously too late.

An experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-operative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going around the short neck and protruding teeth.

Hence, she was negligent.

(2b) For Dr. Orlino Hosaka, as the head of the surgical team and as the so-called captain of the ship, it is the surgeons responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner

Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the captain of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape the court that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's operation, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient.

Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlindas condition.

(2c) As for the hospital (employer) itself, the Court ruled that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.

In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180.

Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlindas condition.

Tuesday, February 21, 2017

A.C. No. 266 TOLEDO v. TOLEDO 7 SCRA 757

TOLEDO v. TOLEDO
7 SCRA 757
A.C. No. 266
April 27, 1963

FACTS: Paz Arellano Toledo, a dentist, alleged that she is the wife of Atty. Jesus Toledo, that she supported and spent for his studies in FEU but after passing the bar, he abandoned. She also alleged that he is cohabiting with another woman and borne him 3 children. She prayed for his disbarment from the practice of law.

Upon the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General which his alleged wife presented pieces of evidence, respondent was charged for abandonment and immorality and the Solicitor prayed that he be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground "that the charges contained therein are not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General." Hence, the Court set the case for hearing. The respondent prayed that his motion be first resolved or be denied, hence invoking Section 6, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

However, instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record his desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed in this Court.

Now, to resolve the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jesus Toledo be disbarred or suspended.

RULING: Yes. The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar. Hence, he is disbarred from the practice of law.

Through a rigorous test by the Solicitor, the maid of respondent, Marina Payot, also testified that the lawyer was living with a person named Corazon Toledo as wife of the respondent with a child of their own, named Angie. Lino Domingo, operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways, also stated that he knows the lawyer and her wife, Corazon, for he goes to the lawyer’s residence every now and then.

The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence.



A.C. No. 1392 OBUSAN v. OBUSAN 128 SCRA 485

OBUSAN v. OBUSAN
A.C. No. 1392
128 SCRA 485
April 2, 1984

FACTS: Respondent Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, and became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo presented to be a widow, in which they had a child named John. Later, it was known Natividad’s marriage was still subsisting.

Four days after the birth of John, Generoso married Preciosa (petitioner) and lived for more than a year. Respondent took a vacation in Camarines Norte but he has never returned.

Preciosa looked for him and discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in Quezon City.

The housemaid, neighbors and several other persons known to Natividad and Obusan testified and confirmed their relationship.

He answered that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa and he only goes to Quezon City to provide financial support to Jun-Jun. He also denied the testimonies of the maid, the plumber and several other persons and contended that he does not live together with Natividad.

He also contended that he only left the conjugal home for he cannot contain the nagging of his wife and her interference with his professional obligations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Obusan should be disbarred.

RULING: Yes. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community"

Thus, lawyer shall be disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. 

A.C. No. 10185 DIZON v. CABUCANA, JR.

DIZON v. CABUCANA, JR.
A.C. No. 10185
March 12, 2014

FACTS: Complainant, Licerio Dizon, alleged that he was one of the “would be” buyers of a parcel of land owned by Callangan in a Civil Case filed before the MTC. On that case, a compromise agreement was executed by the parties before respondent, Atty. Mercelino Cabucana, Jr.

At the hearing, the signatories regarding the compromise agreement therein testified that they signed the instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public; hence, there was delay in the decision of the case which caused damage and injury to the complainant. They also alleged that Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial Law by notarizing in the absence of most of the signatories and uttered grave threats against him after the hearing of the said case.

Hence, he filed a petition against Atty. Cabucana, before the IBP, praying for the disbarment of the latter for falsification of public document.

In his answer, he averred that the complaint was intended to harass him for he was the private prosecutor on a criminal case against Dizon and lack of cause of action for he was only a “would be” buyer.


ISSUE: Whether or not he violated a rule in the CPR through his conduct

RULING: Yes. As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary act and deed.

Hence, the Court finds respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon l of the CPR and suspends him from the practice of law for three (3) months, and prohibits him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.


A.C. No. 6490 TABANG v. GACOTT

TABANG v. GACOTT
A.C. No. 6490
July 9, 2013

FACTS: Complainant Lilia Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Hence, Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons, thus she purchased 7 lands under his advice.

Later, Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels for their medication and other expenses. Atty. Glenn Gaccot offered the parcels to prospective buyers to help her sell thus he borrowed from Tabang the TCTs.

Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels and caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for sale and succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total of P3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.

Hence, pettioners alleged that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit filed a case before the IBP.

Respondent, contended that the names were not fictitious and petitioners only demanded a balato of 20% from the proceeds which in his refusal, he was threatened to be defamed and disbarred.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.

RULING: Yes, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, the Court imposes upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.

Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’ plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.

G.R. No. 141968 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK v. GEUCO 351 SCRA 516

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK v. GEUCO
G.R. No. 141968
February 12, 2001
351 SCRA 516

FACTS: The respondent Gueco Spouses obtained a loan from petitioner (now UnionBank) to purchase a car. Hence, the Spouses executed promissory notes which were payable in monthly installments and chattel mortgage over the car to serve as security for the notes.

The Spouses defaulted in payment. The Bank, therefore, filed a civil action for "Sum of Money with Prayer for a Writ of Replevin" before the MTC. The car was detained inside the Bank’s compound.

Dr. Gueco delivered a manager's check in amount of P150,000.00 but the car was not released because of his refusal to sign the Joint Motion to Dismiss for they had not yet filed their Answer. The Bank insisted that the joint motion to dismiss is standard operating procedure in their bank to effect a compromise and to preclude future filing of claims, counterclaims or suits for damages.

After several demand letters and meetings with bank representatives, the spouses initiated a civil action for damages. The RTC held that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the reduction of the amount of indebtedness and the release of the car but said agreement did not include the signing of the joint motion to dismiss as a condition sine qua non for the effectivity of the compromise.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there was an agreement with respect to the execution of the joint motion to dismiss as a condition for the compromise agreement; and (2) Whether or not the spouses are entitled for damages arising from fraud.

RULING: (1) No. Being an affirmative allegation, petitioner has the burden of evidence to prove his claim that the oral compromise entered into by the parties included the stipulation that the parties would jointly file a motion to dismiss. This petitioner failed to do. Notably, even the Metropolitan Trial Court, while ruling in favor of the petitioner and thereby dismissing the complaint, did not make a factual finding that the compromise agreement included the condition of the signing of a joint motion to dismiss.

(2) No. The Court failed to see how the act of the petitioner bank in requiring the respondent to sign the joint motion to dismiss could constitute as fraud.

Fraud has been defined as the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice. Petitioner may have been remiss in informing Dr. Gueco that the signing of a joint motion to dismiss is a standard operating procedure of petitioner bank. However, this cannot in any way have prejudiced Dr. Gueco.

The whole point of the parties entering into the compromise agreement was in order that Dr. Gueco would pay his outstanding account and in return petitioner would return the car and drop the case for money and replevin before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The joint motion to dismiss was but a natural consequence of the compromise agreement and simply stated that Dr. Gueco had fully settled his obligation, hence, the dismissal of the case.

Hence, petitioner's act of requiring Dr. Gueco to sign the joint motion to dismiss cannot be said to be a deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner to renege on the compromise agreement of the parties.





G.R. No. 188715 REGALA v. CARIN

REGALA v. CARIN
G.R. No. 188715
April 6, 2011

FACTS: Regala and Carin are adjacent neighbors. Regala decided add a second storey to his house, under the guise of merely building an extension to it, and asked Carin for permission to bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by both their respective properties, to which Carin verbally consented.

Regala suffered from the dust and debris, hence, he filed a complaint before the City Engineers Office for lack of building permit and before the Office of Barangay for encroachment, invasion of privacy, damages arising from construction and illegal construction of scaffoldings in his (Regala) property. However, Regala still continued the work despite several notices from the City Engineers Office.

Carin filed a complaint for damages before the RTC alleging that instead of boring just one hole as agreed upon, petitioner demolished the whole length of the wall and that debris and dust piled up on his property.

Regala answered that he was the sole and exclusive owner of the wall referred to as a perimeter wall and that securing the consent was a mere formality to facilitate the issuance of a building permit.

Engineer Haduca found an encroachment by petitioner of six centimeters. Hence, RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carin is entitled to damages arising the wrongful or illegal act or omission of Regala.

RULING: No. It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode.

While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondents consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.


However, Regala cannot steer clear from any liability whatsoever. Carin and his family’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their property have, at the very least, been inconvenienced from the incident borne of petitioners construction work. Any pecuniary loss or damage suffered by respondent cannot be established as the records are bereft of any factual evidence to establish the same. Nominal damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, respondent herein, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

G.R. No. 213181 JARDELEZA v. SERENO 733 SCRA 279

JARDELEZA v. SERENO
G.R. No. 213181
August 19, 2014
733 SCRA 279

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.

However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious.  Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.

RULING: Yes.  While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.  Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. 
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

G.R. No. 128845 INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING 333 SCRA 13

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING
333 SCRA 13
G.R. No. 128845
June 1, 2000

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and  a salary rate 25% more than local hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. 

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity.

RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.

Monday, February 20, 2017

G.R. No. 134625 UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA 313 SCRA 404

UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA
G.R. No. 134625
August 31, 1999
313 SCRA 404

FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.

After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.

Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree.

The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the University Council.

She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President

Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to substantive due process.

RULING: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several times.

Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.

In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

Sunday, February 19, 2017

G.R. No. 163026 HEIRS OF CASTRO v. LOZADA 679 SCRA 271

HEIRS OF CASTRO v. LOZADA
G.R. NO. 163026
August 29, 2012

FACTS: Respondents are the occupants/tillers of a rice land (Lot 546) and recognized Arcadio Castro, Sr. as their landlord. They filed applications to purchase the said lot. However, records showed that the registered claimant is one "Arcadio Cruz."

Consequently, the Land Inspector issued a clearance of sale to the tenants. However, the application was stalled by Arcadio Castro, Sr. who contended that through his sister-in-law, they were paying the “cost and rental” of the lot for he owns it.

In 1990, upon findings that “Arcadio Cruz” and Aracadio Castro, Sr. is doubtful to be the same and the payments made cannot be presumed that it is one for the main parcel, the DAR declared that the lot is vacant, due to lack of evidence.

Petitioners thus contend that the DAR Secretary’s reliance on a baseless report violated their constitutional right to due process. They claim that the DAR Secretary ignored vital documentary evidence showing that Arcadio Castro, Sr. was really the listed claimant of Lot 546 and that he had made payments for it.

ISSUE: Whether the DAR violated the constitutional right to due process of the petitioners

RULING: No. Petitioners evidence were duly considered and evaluated by said officials and all were one in concluding that Arcadio Castro, Sr. has not acquired any vested right over the subject land.

The DAR Secretary’s finding that petitioners failed to prove that the registered claimant of said land, "Arcadio Cruz" and Castro are one and the same person is based on the fact that Castro and his heirs never exerted efforts to correct the supposed error in the LTA/DAR files, and the absence of any document to show that Castro filed an application to purchase Lot 546.

As well as some of the OR indicating payments are also unreadable, and that the payments made for the “cost and rental” have no reference to Lot 546. Even if it’s true that the DAR did not have complete records before it, petitioners could have submitted those documents to them for their Petition for Review.

A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.

Hence, the DAR did not violate the right to due process of the petitioners




G.R. No. 144104 LUNG CENTER OF THE PHIL v. ORTIGAS 717 SCRA 601

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHIL v. ORTIGAS
G.R. No. 144104
June 29, 2004
717 SCRA 601

FACTS: The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Quezon City and erected in the middle is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines.

The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying, as well as private leases.

Both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City.

The petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption5 from real property taxes with the City Assessor, stating that it is a charitable institution within the context of Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160; and (2) whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes.

RULING: (1) Yes. The Court held that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage. Hence, the Lung Center was organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people.

As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, so long as the money received is devoted to charitable objects and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. As well as the reason of donation in the form of subsidies granted by the government.

(2) No. Those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.

The petitioner failed to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen.

Hence, the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

G.R. No. 171496 REPUBLIC v. ORTIGAS 717 SCRA 601

REPUBLIC v. ORTIGAS
G.R. No. 171496
717 SCRA 601
March 03, 2014

FACTS: Respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its property and reserved one portion for road widening. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A-1 which was  actually used for road widening and it was not compensated for the use of its property.

Respondent filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the government the said lot and alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance of the property for road widening purposes.

Petitioner filed an opposition, alleging that respondent Ortigas’ property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to the Republic of the Philippines only by donation.

RULING: No. Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must be compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public road purposes.

Petitioner’s reliance on the Property Registration Decree is erroneous. It contemplates roads and streets in a subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private property that was taken from an owner for public purpose.

As a rule, when there is taking of private property for some public purpose, the owner of the property taken is entitled to be compensated.

There is taking when the following elements are present:

1. The government must enter the private property;
2. The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or permanent;
3. There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;
4. The property is devoted to public use or purpose;
5. The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

All of the above elements are present in this case. Petitioner construction of a road — a permanent structure — on respondent Ortigas’ property for the use of the general public is an obvious permanent entry on petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ part. Given that the road was constructed for general public use gives it public character, and coursing the entry through the DPWH gives it a color of legal authority. As a result, respondent may not anymore use the property for whatever legal purpose it may desire. In other words, respondent was effectively deprived of all the bundle of rights attached to ownership of property.

Hence, respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to the Republic of the Philippines with just compensation.